Turretin: The Simplicity of God, Continued

The following is an excerpt from the Institutes of Elenctic Theology, III. VII. V.

Seventh Question: The Simplicity of God

Is God most simple and free from all composition? We affirm against Socinus and Vorstius.

From the removal of all species of composition (such as physical – of matter and form, since he is incorporeal); or of quantitative parts (which do not apply to God); or of subject and accident (because no accident can make the most perfect still more perfect); and logical (of kind and difference because God is above every genus, nor is his a common nature capable of being restricted by difference); metaphysical act and power (since he is a pure act and incapable of change properly so called, to whom nothing new can happen or be received by him); of essence and existence (as in created things in which the nature of existence differs from that of essence, since their essence can be conceived without existence; nor does existence enter into their definition because they can be and not be, and existence with respect to them is something contingent, not necessary.  For in God essence cannot be conceived without existence, and it is repugnant to conceive of God as not existing; hence philosophers call him a being by essence (i.e., which exists in virtue of its own essence) and of the nature of whose essence it is that he always exists.  For this reason, God calls himself Jehovah to signify that being belongs to him in a far different manner than to all created things, not participatively and contingently, but necessarily, properly and independently.  Finally, his simplicity is proved from nature and subsistence; for person and essence are not related as real component extremes from which a tertium quid may arise (as in human things from the nature of man and the subsistence of Peter arises that person whom we call Peter); otherwise not a Trinity but a certain quaternity would be conceived of in God; nor do modes (such as subsistences)compose, they only modify.