Turretin: The Simplicity of God, Continued

The following is an excerpt from the Institutes of Elenctic Theology, III. vii. 8-10.

Seventh Question: The Simplicity of God Is God most simple and free from all composition?  We affirm against Socinus and Vorstius.

VIII.  Composition is in that in which there is more than one real entity, but not where there is only more than one mode because modes only modify and characterize, but do not compose the essence.  But in divine things there are one essence and three hypostases (which are modes distinguishing indeed the persons from each other, but not composing because they are not real entities concurring to the composition of some fourth thing, since they have one common essence; but they are only modifications according to which the essence is conceived to subsist in three persons).

IX.  Simplicity and triplicity are so mutually opposed that they cannot subsist at the same time (but not simplicity and Trinity because they are said in different respects): simplicity in respect to essence, but Trinity in respect to persons.  In this sense, nothing hinders God (who is one in essence) from being three persons.

X.  The decrees of God can be regarded in two ways: either subjectively (if it is right so to speak, i.e., on the part of the internal act in itself and absolutely); or objectively, extrinsically and relatively with respect to creatures (respectively).  In the former manner, they do not differ from God himself and are no other than God himself decreeing.  But in the latter, they do differ because they may be conceived as many and various (not as to the thing, since God has decreed all things by one single and most simple act, but as to the objects), even as the knowledge of God is conversant with innumberable objects without detriment to his unity.